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COMMENT ON RULE, STORY, AND COMMITMENT IN THE
TEACHING OFLEGAL ETHICS, BY ROGER C. CRAMTON
AND SUSAN P. KONIAK
JOHN M. LEVY*
In Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics,' (the "Article") Professors Cramton and Koniak challenge
the academy by wondering whether we, as educators, really take
responsibility for the ethical education and training of future
members of the legal profession, or whether we just engage in
"[tirendy lip service to our better selves"-the Doonesbury Thesis.2 They present a tight case for both retaining the ABA requirement of a mandatory ethics course3 and for taking steps to
disprove the Doonesbury Thesis by making the teaching of legal
ethics and the law of lawyering more effective.4
Overall, I agree with their diagnosis and prescription.5 My
only criticism is that their focus is too narrow. In one sense I am
saying that I would have written the Article differently, or at
least I would have added some things. In another sense I believe
that by focusing only on the academy and law schools,6 we are
doomed to failure because that, too, is a form of "lip service to
our better selves."7
* John M. Levy is a Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education at the
William & Mary School of Law. Special thanks to Paula Hannaford, National Center
for State Courts, for her substantial help with this Comment.
1. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Stoy, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1996).
2. Id. (quoting Garry B. Trudeau, Doonesbury (1975), reprinted in THOmAS D.
MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (6th ed. 1995)).
3. Id. at 150-64.
4. See id. passim.
5. As a teacher of legal ethics of course I would agree. In fact, one can assume
that everyone involved with this conference believes that what they do, teach, and

write is important.
6. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 146-48.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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I agree with the Authors that law schools have responded
poorly to the ethics teaching requirement, and that such a response is inexcusable.' I think, however, that we need to keep
our bit of reality in perspective, realizing that the notion "[t]hat
changes in the curriculum are the answer to all public deficiencies is, of course, in keeping with the great American tradition of
painless reform. Everything from the study of Chaucer to the
pursuit of 'social science' has been proposed."9 Law schools'
weak commitment to teaching ethics parallels the ABA's halfhearted enforcement of the mandate to teach ethics." The possibility that a connection between the two exists is an issue that
the Authors fail to address.
In the first section of the Article, the Authors ask, "Should the
[elthics [riequirement [be [sicrapped?"" The Authors acknowledge the debate concerning the extent to which the ABA can or
should exercise authority over law schools, especially in curricular matters.1 2 Understandably, however, the Authors do not
attempt to resolve that debate in their Article. Another "unmentionable" question that I believe the Article should address, but
does not, is whether the ABA should energetically enforce the
ethics teaching requirement.
Much of the Article illustrates the number of ways that the
academy has forsaken, or in some cases ignored, the ABA's ethics teaching requirement.1 3 The academy's failure in this area
parallels failures in other parts of the legal profession: judges
fail to enforce lawyers' ethical duties"' and lawyers fail to enforce the ethical duties of their peers. 5 Viewed as a whole,

8. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 146-48, 153-55 (noting that students
perceive ethics classes to be easier than other classes and that law schools tend to
at least implicitly undervalue the importance of legal ethics through "casual" teacher
selection and through offering lower credit ethics courses).
9. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 19 (1964).
10. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 153-54 (noting that law schools have
not taught ethics well partly because the ABA has not rigorously enforced its ethics
teaching requirement).
11. Id. at 150.
12. See id. at 150-54.
13. See id. passim.
14. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 453-60 (3d
ed. 1989).
15. Id.
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these parallels seem to suggest a general failure of the system.
Perhaps, however, the parallels do not point to systemic failure
so much as they may just indicate the inevitable imperfections
of a regulatory or legal system.
I return to the question of whether the ABA should energetically enforce the ethics teaching requirement. When the ABA, or
anyone outside of the academy, such as legislators, seeks to
impose requirements on law schools, issues arise that are as
sensitive as the character questions raised by the Authors."6
The Article argues that the character of the teacher is crucial in
teaching ethics.' We must, therefore, ensure as sensitively as
possible that teachers of legal ethics, or of any law course for
that matter, are virtuous and of good character. 8 The Authors
acknowledge the danger of abuse inherent in inquiring into the
character of candidates. They point out, however, that we
make similarly sensitive judgments about the teaching and
scholarship of potential colleagues during the hiring process. °
Because character is so central to ethics instruction, we should
evaluate the character of candidates for those teaching positions
as we would evaluate any other job requirement.2 '
I submit that the same analysis and conclusion would apply
to the question of enforcing the ABA's ethics requirement on
law schools.2 2 Surely, enforcement of the ethics requirement
bears some of the same dangers, such as penalizing difference
and creativity.' I wonder, however, if, as the Authors say, the
"real problem" with looking at character "is not potential injustice," but, rather, is "that[] by opening up the question of virtue

16. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 189-93.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 193-94.
20. See id. at 191.
21. See id. at 190-93. For example, state bars evaluate character as part of the
admission process. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral CharacterAs a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 546-49 (1985) (discussing the current ethical double standard
regarding disbarment procedures and certification procedures).
22. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 153-54. One could argue that the
ABA ethics requirement for law school accreditation is analogous to the character
requirement for bar admission.
23. See id. at 191-92.
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at all," we cross a line "that makes many of us feel especially
vulnerable."24
I agree with the conclusion that taking "character out of the
closet.... makes ethics real and a thing of consequence."' It
could even make the law school hiring process a meaningful,
ethical, and moral experience for law school communities; what
a marvelous thing that would be! As the Authors say, however,
it would also make most of us feel vulnerable and very
uncomfortable.26
Although this reasoning, which inquires into character, poses
dangers, it seems to me, to be a worthwhile endeavor and it
seems equally valid for the ABA accreditation process. Because
William and Mary was recently reaccredited, I realize how hard
this type of inquiry would be. I want to believe, however, that
the law school community of which I am a part would benefit
from being forced to justify what it does, and does not do, in the
teaching of ethics and character. I believe, or perhaps more
accurately, I want to believe, that enough countervailing forces
exist against orthodoxy, prejudice, vindictiveness, jealousy, and
fanaticism to allow the benefits of such an inquiry to prevail.
The Article does raise the possibility that the ABA might give
its teaching of ethics requirement some teeth and use "coercion," 7 by announcing that: "if it cared to enforce its requirement, [the ABA] could insist that full-time faculty teach the
course." The Authors, however, then stop that line of inquiry
and, I submit, resume preaching to the choir. I hope that "tunnel
vision," the charge leveled against the bar, is not at work
here.29 I wonder if putting law faculty in control of remedying
this problem is similar to "[plutting lawyers in charge of their
own ethics [and, therefore, is] like putting Dracula in charge of
the blood bank." 0 I would argue that resorting to sanctions is
24. Id. at 191.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 191.
27. See id. at 157.
28. Id.
29. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 52 (1994) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689, 720 (1981)).
30. Id. (citing MILTON R. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 67 (1980) (quoting
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the appropriate course of action; however, the appeal to conscience, the approach outlined by the Authors, seems to be the
approach currently advocated by many reformers.3
We need someone to explore what it might mean if the profession becomes serious and decides to use coercion to enforce ethical mandates. I challenge us, the ethics teaching establishment,
in addition to looking inward or preaching to ourselves, to petition the ABA to enforce its ethics teaching requirement. I wonder what would happen if the ABA began denying or even pulling accreditation from those schools that do not have primarily
tenured or tenure track people teaching ethics,3 2 and that do
not use the pervasive approach with some "institutional monitoring [measures to ensure] that individual faculty members take
their responsibility seriously."33 If we do not do something
along these lines, perhaps we are engaging in the self-deception
of which the Doonesbury Thesis spoke, or worse yet, contributing to a form of "anti-ethics."'
The Authors offer their vision of the ideal curriculum for the

Michael Knight, Lawyer Panel Urges Public Control of Legal Ethics, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1979, at A14)). The Authors provide support for this analogy by noting the
low value that full-time faculty place on teaching legal ethics. See Cramton &
Koniak, supra note 1, at 146-47 & n.14.
31. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on The Professionalism Crusade,
74 TEx. L. REV. 259, 276-80 (1995) (discussing the current crusade to restore lawyer
professionalism). Atkinson states that the leiders of this reform crusade do not advocate coercive enforcement measures, but, rather, advocate voluntary enforcement with
"the hope of transcending, or at least supplementing, law with gospel." Id. at 275.
The state bars and the academy have implicitly utilized this approach. See id. at
277-78 (discussing state bar professionalism drives). First, however, state bars employ what Atkinson calls the "legalism" remedy by "bringing legally enforceable prescriptions or proscriptions to bear on the problem." Id. at 280. When the problem
remains, state bars then shift tactics to the gospel approach by emphasizing a "communal recommitment to shared values." Id. An undercurrent to both approaches is
the current reluctance to enforce regulations, ostensibly on the grounds that the
profession is over-regulated-a condition that is anticompetitive and stifling in the
current legal market. See id. at 277.
32. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 146-47 & n.11 (noting that several
prestigious law schools do not have a mandatory ethics course and yet remain accredited).
33. Id. at 168 (noting that the current approach to teaching ethics may naturally
impart negative lessons to students).
34. See id. at 154.
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law and ethics of lawyering.35 Their vision requires law schools
to: teach some ethics in the first year;36 establish a survey
course of at least three semester-hours;? use the pervasive
method to teach ethics and the law of lawyering throughout the
curricula; 38 offer an array of courses dealing with more specialized or particularized aspects of ethics; 9 and have tenured and
tenure track members of the faculty, with a serious scholarly
interest in the law and ethics of lawyering, teach these courses.4" The Authors' plan is refreshing and complete, although I
would go a step further with respect to their first point. I would
require a first-year survey course that provides a foundation in
the basic concepts of the law of lawyering and in the institutional structure and ethics of the profession. I would establish
this requirement because, after the first year, I believe that
many law students treat required courses less seriously just
because they are required and are offered during the second or
third year.
As with my earlier point, I would suggest that the Authors
expand their focus, again, to outside the academy. I agree that
stories are important; they "illuminate society's commitment-or
lack of commitment-to the enforcement of the literal text of
rules."4 ' Moreover, the stories that have the most meaning to
law students are those told by judges in their opinions.4 2 The
overwhelming importance of judicial opiffions as stories,4 3 however, creates a large problem because many, if not most, opinions ignore, or at least appear to ignore, violations of the ethical
rules that are readily apparent in the cases and the lawyers'
actions."

35. See id. at 164-69.
36. Id. at 166.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 166-68.
39. Id. at 168-69.
40. Id. at 169.
41. Id. at 176. The Authors note that "[s]tories provide the context and detail essential to understanding and applying legal rules." Id. at 177. See also id. at 177
n.114 (listing scholarship on the use of narrative in legal education generally).
42. Id. at 177 ("The heartland of legal education involves the case method.").
43. See id. at 177-79.
44. See KAUFMAN, supra note 14, at 674 (noting the reluctance of lawyers and
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One early and useful definition of the pervasive approach
requires that every member of the faculty "take special care to
point out and discuss in their regular courses various latent
professional responsibility issues ....
[Tihe aim is to lead the
student to recognize professional responsibility issues that are
suggested by cases in the casebook."45 Pointing out and discussing the "latent" ethical issues that arise in judicial opinions,
however, does not explain why the judges failed to explicitly deal
with them in the first place.4" Many law students might, and
rightly should, wonder about this state of affairs.47 When courts
fail to see, or to call attention to, problems in the stories that
they tell, students often conclude that the "real world" must not
see them as problems and, therefore, they must not be problems.48 Of course, we law teachers can draw out, or help students draw out, "latent" ethical issues in stories. This exercise
poses another problem. When we raise these "latent" issues,
students may see us, once again, as living in our ivory towers.4 9
In taking this inquiry one step further, suppose that students
understood, hopefully because we had taught them, that these
judges were breaching their ethical duties by failing to report
the possibly unethical conduct of the lawyers in their stories to
the proper authorities. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct
states:
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial
likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct should take appropriate action.
A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a

judges to report misconduct) (quoting from the ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970)).
45. Theodore A. Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale--"The
Vanderbilt Experiment", 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 435, 437 (1963) (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 29, at 385 (discussing divorce negotiations in
which one of the lawyers engaged in some questionable conduct). Professor Rhode
noted that "[i]nterestingly enough, the appellate court made no comment about the
conduct of the husband's attorney. Should it?" Id.
47. Id.
48. See John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of Ethics-Fear and
Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 100 (1982).
49. See id.
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violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the
appropriate authority."
Students who had read the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
would know that the judge should report the lawyer. Because
the opinion gave no indication that the judge had reported the
lawyer, or even that the judge had perceived a problem, students
would likely think that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct was
just another example of Doonesbury's "lip service."5 1
The fact that judges apparently ignore their ethical duty to
report lawyers' violations, I think, speaks to another problem
that the Authors raise. They state that "[ilt is a fact of life that
professional discipline is not the principal sanction that influences or controls lawyer behavior."52 Is this a good thing? I am not
asking whether the profession's "normative vision"" or other
state laws" should control in case of conflict. Rather, I question
why, when a rule, alone and not in conflict with other law, covers the lawyer's conduct, the fear of discipline fails to act as "the
principal sanction that influences or controls lawyer behavior."55 For years the reason has been that the chance that the
lawyer's behavior will be reported is very remote; thus, the imposition of any disciplinary or remedial action is similarly unlikely.5" To state the obvious, lawyers and judges are in the
best position to know of many ethical violations. As long as both

50. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(2) (1990) (citations omitted).

51. See supra text accompanying note 2.

52. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 172.
53. Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1389, 1392 (1992).
54. Id. at 1390-95 (outlining the struggle between the bar and states to define
what the law governing lawyers means); see also Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1,
at 173-74 (discussing the conflict between state laws and rules of ethics).
55. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 172.
56. See Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 1005. "Only after the identification function is improved are prosecutorial and adjudicatory procedures and policies of primary
importance. Without adequate information input, the system cannot attend to, because
it does not know about, the majority of instances of lawyer misconduct." Id
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groups continue to ignore their reporting duties,57 the Rules
will continue to have very little meaning for the profession. The
profession jealously guards its authority to self-regulate.5 8 Even
when threatened with proposals for legislative or executive
branch regulation of lawyers' conduct,5 9 however, the commitment from all parts of the profession to enforce the Rules has
been halfhearted at best.6" The profession's own conduct validates the Doonesbury Thesis.6
I end this Comment with an expression of thanks and admiration to Professors Cramton and Koniak for an Article that takes
risks in striving for "the jewel." 2 The Article serves as an example of the moral courage needed to make changes in our
small, but important, corner of the profession. The Article makes
an important and elegant appeal to the conscience of the academy. My only point is that we need to remind ourselves that if
the "law of lawyering" is ignored by teachers, judges, and lawyers, appeals to conscience will be, in effect, "lip service"' and
will be utterly hollow.

57. See KAUFmAN, supra note 14.

58. See RHODE, supra note 29, at 39-45 (providing an overview of regulation of the
profession).
59. See Koniak, supra note 53, at 1390-95 (outlining the struggle between the bar
and the state over whose view of the law is supreme).
60. See KAUFMAN, supra note 14.
61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. By failing to enforce the ethical
rules, the profession sends the message that these rules are not very important and
thus only "lip service" needs to be paid to them. Id.
62. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 198 (quoting SOREN A. KIERKEGAARD,
PARABLES OF KIERKEGAARD 15-16 (Thomas C. Oden ed., 1978)).
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

